The deepest beliefs’ about personal identity whose consequences Unger seeks to draw out are the beliefs of those who already share his theoretical convictions; and his pain-avoidance’ experiments show nothing unless one already assumes those convictions. If there is a risk’ that I may not survive a brain operation even though I know exactly which chunks of brain will be removed and replaced, that shows that I am a separate thing from my body and brain, about which the latter provide (...) normally reliable, but still fallible evidence. (shrink)

Value and uncertainty are the critical components of decision and action. To think of the affective system as at the core of action is to draw attention to the role of affect in representing and combining these two dimensions, and orchestrating a wide range of mental capacities—attention, perception, memory, inference, motivation, and monitoring—in light of these evaluative representations. The commentators have helpfully enriched our appreciation of the various ways in which affect can contribute to the attunement, cuing, motivation, control, and (...) ongoing assessment of decision and action. (shrink)

David Lewis was ideally equipped for the venture. In his life he was a great celebrator of value, in ideas, arguments, music, history, trains, and, above all, sociability and humour. Indeed, the author suspects that, in his own life, desiring and valuing, and valuing and desiring, were intimately connected. Lewis rejects accounts of the valuing attitude in terms of judging to be valuable, taking to be valuable, believing to be valuable, or even experiencing as valuable. Conditional relationalism would have a (...) better fit, he thinks, with his underlying pluralism, which is tied to a lively sense of the delightful and devilish variety among humankind. The author finds Lewis's account of value congenial in many respects. He was fortunate to have had the chance to discuss some questions of further development with Lewis. (shrink)